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Footnotes
1. See Symposium, Rethinking Judicial Selection: A Critical Appraisal
of Appointive Selection for State Court Judges, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
(2007). Together the oral and written presentations will some-
times be referred to as the “symposium” or the “Fordham sympo-
sium,” without discriminating between oral and written presenta-
tions of the participants. The symposium sponsors were the
American Judicature Society, the Constitution Project, the League
of Women Voters of New York State Education Foundation, the
Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics at Fordham University
School of Law, and the Fund for Modern Courts, with grant sup-
port from Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Open
Society Institute.
2. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Malignant Democracy: Core Fallacies
Underlying Election of the Judiciary, 4 NEV. L.J. 35-36 (2003).
3. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 792 (2002)
(O’Connor, J. concurring). Since the date of the Supreme Court’s
decision, reformers in Minnesota have been considering the adop-
tion of commission-based appointment of judges. See Citizens
Commission for the Preservation of an Impartial Judiciary, Final
Report and Recommendations, Mar. 26, 2007 (Minnesota commis-
sion proposal to appoint judges, with a judicial performance eval-
uation plan) (hereinafter Citizens Commission, Final Report),
available at http://keepmnjusticeimpartial.org/FinalReportAnd
Recommendation.pdf.
The subject of the selection of state court judges has manyaspects, including the choice of the selection system, thedesign of the selection system, the comparison of alterna-
tive modes of selection, and the effect of the system on judicial
performance or decision making, including “judicial indepen-
dence.”  This article addresses many of these aspects and takes
as its starting point a unique symposium of articles published
in a special issue of the Fordham Urban Law Journal in the
Spring of 2007, preceded in time by a daylong symposium with
the authors held at Fordham Law School on April 7, 2006.1
The symposium investigated judicial selection systems by
appointment and asked if a well-designed appointment system
is the best way to select judges, what should that system look
like?  As the organizer of the symposium, as well as both a par-
ticipant and an observer, I will synthesize many of its themes.
To provide context to the discussion, the article will also elab-
orate on some of the problems associated with judicial elec-
tions, the principal alternative mode of judicial selection. 
This article then goes beyond the Fordham symposium by
considering some of the problems that may arise when indi-
viduals without qualifications become judges.  The article
focuses on the issue of non-lawyer judges who serve in various
states in courts of limited yet important jurisdiction; and it
uses as a case study the judges in New York State’s Town and
Village Courts.  These courts were the subject of widespread
negative press coverage in 2006 and are now the subject of
administrative and legislative scrutiny and reform.    
Finally, the article reflects on the complexities of indepen-
dence in judicial decision  making.  The phrase “judicial inde-
pendence” is often used, little understood, and frequently
undefined.   But it is related to the mechanisms used to select
and retain judges:  among other things, some selection systems
by their very design may provide judges with an incentive to
decide cases with an eye toward retaining their positions.
Whatever else it means, judicial independence cannot mean
freedom to make decisions solely based on a judge’s self-inter-
est in staying in his or her position. Some attention to this core
principle of justice therefore needs to be paid when deciding
on any system of judicial selection or retention.
I. THE FORDHAM SYMPOSIUM: DESIGNING AND
APPRAISING THE BEST APPOINTIVE SYSTEMS
[O]ne can rationally and correctly embrace democ-
racy as a whole while realizing that not every public
office in a democracy needs to be filled by popular elec-
tion. The office of judge—at both the trial and appellate
level (including the state’s highest court)—is one of
those offices. . . . There is no requirement of democra-
tic theory that mandates that all public offices be filled
by election.2
Minnesota has chosen to select its judges through
contested popular elections instead of through an
appointment system or a combined appointment and
retention election system. . . .If the State has a problem
with judicial impartiality, it is largely one the State
brought upon itself by continuing the practice of popu-
larly electing judges. 3
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hood that those judges will perform their duties with an eye
toward the electorate’s expectations…”).
7. See generally Norman L. Greene, Perspectives on Judicial Selection,
56 MERCER L. REV. 949, 950 n. 3 (2005) (hereinafter, Greene,
Perspectives).
8. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002). See Charles G. Geyh, Rethinking
Judicial Elections, BILL OF PARTICULARS, Spring 2003,
http://www.law.indiana.edu/publications/particulars/2003spring/c
geyh.shtml (statement by judicial aspirant during a judicial cam-
paign is “uniquely important” since may “be treated as a condition
of his selection”; “judges will obviously feel greater need to
adhere” to such positions).
9. Raymond A. Sobocinski, Adumbrations on Judicial Campaign
Speech, 43 IDAHO L. REV. 193 (2006). However, increasing knowl-
edge of judicial performance so as to provide meaningful voter
choice is not the subject of White. Norman L. Greene, Reflections
on the Appointment and Election of State Court Judges: A Response to
Adumbrations on Judicial Campaign Speech and a Model for a
Response to Similar Advocacy Articles, 43 IDAHO L. REV. 601 (2007).
10. Robert H. Tembeckjian, Perspective: Campaign Speech and the
Administration of Justice, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 29, 2006. The author of the
article in this footnote is administrator and counsel to the New
York State Commission on Judicial Conduct. He was also a pan-
elist at the Fordham symposium.
11. Stempel, supra note 2, at 46 (“…there is likely to be little real
information about the judicial philosophy, ideology, or past record
of candidates for judge. Thus most voters participating in local
judicial elections are largely shooting in the dark in casting their
ballots.”) (footnote omitted).
4. There was consideration about retention elections at the sympo-
sium, since retention elections form an important part of many
existing appointment systems. See John F. Irwin & Daniel L. Real,
Enriching Judicial Independence: Seeking to Improve the Retention
Vote Phase of an Appointment Selection System, 34 FORDHAM URB.
L.J 453 (2007) (hereinafter Irwin & Real, Enriching). See also John
F. Irwin & Daniel L. Real, Thoughts About Enriching Judicial
Independence by Improving the Retention Vote Phase of Appointive
Selection Systems, 43 CT. REV. 60 (2006).
5. See, e.g., JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS (2006), available at http://www.justiceatstake.org
/files/NewPoliticsofJudicialElections2006.pdf.
6. Adam Liptak & Janet Roberts, Campaign Cash Mirrors a High
Court’s Rulings, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2006 at A1 (“An examination
of the Ohio Supreme Court by The New York Times found that its
justices routinely sat on cases after receiving campaign contribu-
tions from the parties involved or from groups that filed support-
ing briefs. On average, they voted in favor of contributors 70 per-
cent of the time.”). According to the article, the key questions
asked by the study were how often did the Ohio Supreme Court
hear cases involving major contributors and how did justices vote
in those cases. Id. See also Madhavi M. McCall & Michael A.
McCall, Campaign Contributions, Judicial Decisions, and the Texas
Supreme Court: Assessing the Appearance of Impropriety, 90
JUDICATURE 214, 216 (March-April 2007) (“public opinion surveys
indicate that many in the electorate believe justices alter their
behavior to accommodate the preferences of campaign contribu-
tors.”); Luke Bierman, Help Wanted: Is There a Better Way to Select
Judges, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J 511, 519 (2007) (“Selecting judges
through popular electoral processes presents the distinct likeli-
A. The Nature of the Symposium
Titled Rethinking Judicial Selection: A Critical Appraisal of
Appointive Selection for State Court Judges, the Fordham sym-
posium included articles and commentary from some 20 par-
ticipants from 15 states. Several of the represented states
appoint many or all of their judges (e.g., Arizona, Colorado,
Kansas, Nebraska, and Wyoming).  While 15 states were rep-
resented in the symposium, virtually any state could have been
represented in a discussion about judicial appointments. At
least some judges are appointed in most if not all states; even
if a state does not appoint judges as a general matter, judges at
a minimum may be appointed to fill unexpired terms of retir-
ing judges.   The authors and panelists at the symposium
reflected an array of expertise. There were professors of law
and political science, judges and practicing lawyers, as well as
experts in the area of judicial conduct and court reform. 
B. The Background: The Ills of Judicial Elections
Although the symposium did not focus on the problems
associated with judicial elections,4 a brief discussion of some of
these problems provides context for the symposium’s primary
focus. These problems include the need to raise campaign
funds (often from attorneys who practice before the court) to
finance expensive campaigns;5 expanded judicial campaign
speech; the lack of voter education about the candidates; the
lack of voter participation in elections; and the prevalence of
contentious judicial campaigns. According to a New York Times
study of judicial elections in
Ohio, expensive campaigns
make it appear that justice is
for sale to campaign contribu-
tors.6 Also, contentious elec-
tions spoil the image of the
judiciary through negative
campaign advertisements
about the candidates.7
In addition, the lack of restriction on judicial campaign
speech as a result of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White and subsequent cases
threatens a loss (or at least perception of loss) of judicial
impartiality.8 Under the rulings of these cases, judicial candi-
dates may now announce their personal views on certain legal
and political issues, and within limits, may solicit funds for
their campaigns. Some have argued that the result of White will
be a more informed electorate and more meaningful elections.9
Others contend that the purpose of the lawsuits challenging
restrictions on judicial speech has been “to loosen the con-
straints on judicial candidates so that a more ideologically pure
group of candidates would be identified and elected.”10
Judicial elections have often been criticized for failing to
permit voters to exercise any meaningful choice, since, among
other things, voter education on judicial performance is noto-
riously inadequate.11 Judicial elections therefore have little to
do with keeping poor candidates from getting on the bench
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[V]oter education
on judicial 
performance is
notoriously
inadequate.
12. This article does not seek to compare the quality of elected versus
appointed judges, and the author is well aware of the difficulty in
measuring quality and applying the test of quality to each indi-
vidual judge. The above comment solely observes that voters who
lack any knowledge of the judge’s performance cannot effectively
keep the poorly performing judges off the bench. A good discus-
sion of the subject of judicial quality appears at Steven Zeidman,
To Elect or Not to Elect: A Case Study of Judicial Selection in New
York City 1977-2002, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 791, 803 et seq.
(2004). Professor Zeidman was a Fordham symposium partici-
pant.
13. Stempel, supra note 2, at 46, 51. See also, Sarah Elizabeth Saucedo,
Majority Rules Except in New Mexico: Constitutional and Policy
Concerns Raised by New Mexico’s Supermajority Requirement for
Judicial Retention, 86 B.U. L. REV. 173, 217 (2006) (noting that in
retention elections, most voters abstain or “’vote blind” because
they have to make a “decision on which they have no basis for
judgment” (quoting Robert C. Luskin et al., How Minority Judges
Fare in Retention Elections, 77 JUDICATURE 316, 319 (1994)). To the
same effect, see Pamela S. Karlan, Judicial Independences, 95 GEO.
L.J. 1041, 1046 (2007)(“voters [in judicial elections] are likely to
cast their ballots in ignorance; they often seem to support (or
oppose) every incumbent, vote a straight ticket without any
knowledge of the relationship between party and judicial philoso-
phy (if there is one), or simply not vote at all”).
14. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., SHARED
EXPECTATIONS, JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN CONTEXT (2006), at 15
(hereinafter, SHARED EXPECTATIONS) (footnotes omitted). A copy of
the report is available through the institute’s website at
http://www.du.edu/legalinstitute/index.htm 
15. Stempel, supra note 2, at 44.
16. SHARED EXPECTATIONS, supra note 14, at 3.
17. The Fordham symposium sought to differentiate itself from pro-
grams where advocacy dominates as opposed to studying judicial
selection systems. For the problem of advocacy in the literature of
state judicial selection, see F. Andrew Hanssen, The Political
Economy of Judicial Selection: Theory and Evidence, 9 KAN. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 413, 419 (2000) (“Most of what I have seen on judicial
selection in the states…takes the form of advocating one method
or another rather than simply trying to determine whether there
are systematic differences, and if so, what they are and why.”) 
18. Thomas F. Whelan, Symposium on the Best Appointive System for
the Selection of State Court Judges, THE SUFFOLK LAWYER, Apr. 2006
at 24, reprinted in THE JURIST, Fall 2006–Winter 2007, at 14,
sought to summarize the presentations at the Fordham sympo-
sium in April 2006. Justice Whelan is a New York State Supreme
Court justice who attended the Fordham symposium in April
2006. My article, What Makes a Good Appointive System for the
Selection of State Court Judges: The Vision of the Symposium, 34
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 35 (2007), among other things, captured many
of the themes of both the oral and written symposium presenta-
tions.
19. See Mary L. Volcansek, Appointing Judges the European Way, 34
FORDHAM URB. L.J 363 (2007); Judith L. Maute, English Reforms to
Judicial Selection: Comparative Lessons for American States? 34
FORDHAM URB. L.J 387 (2007). 
and removing them once
they are there.12 Lacking
substantive information, vot-
ers sometimes vote “blind”
based on cues having noth-
ing to do with judicial qual-
ity or perhaps upon the basis
of the last political sign they
observed; many do not vote
at all. 13 “Without accurate
and relevant knowledge
about the specific judges at
issue, voters are prone to
base their decisions on fac-
tors such as ethnicity, gen-
der, name recognition, party
affiliation, or length of time
on the bench. Even worse,
without information to inform their choices, a significant
number of voters apparently cast a vote without any rationale
at all.”14 Furthermore, voters may be generally unable to assess
a judge’s technical skills, including the judge’s mastery of rules
of evidence and the judge’s ability to master complex issues of
substantive law.15 “As a consequence, voters tend to vote based
on cues unrelated to a judge’s performance, such as ethnicity
or party affiliation, where that information is available.”16
C. The Issues at the Fordham Symposium
The Fordham symposium considered various existing state
court systems for appointing judges, reviewed their strengths
and weaknesses, and attempted to propose solutions, includ-
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ing suggesting new systems or designs. Determining whether
to elect or appoint judges is an issue that has been the subject
of extensive and not always useful debate,17 but determining
which type of appointive system to employ has been the sub-
ject of too little discussion. As noted previously, in this article
I am highlighting some of the subjects of the symposium with-
out attempting to summarize either the program itself or the
published papers.18
The symposium focused primarily on commission-based
appointive systems for selecting state court judges. In these
systems, judicial nominating commissions propose a limited
number of nominees for the appointing authority, typically a
governor or other local appointing authority, to select as a
judge. The most commonly recommended commissions con-
sist of judicial nominating commissioners who are bipartisan
and include both lawyers and non-lawyers. Matters considered
at the symposium included selection and composition of the
membership of judicial nominating commissions; the encour-
agement of diversity (defined broadly) in appointive systems,
both for nominating commissioners and nominees; the extent
of involvement of the appointing authority in the selection
process; the openness of the judicial selection process; the
development of codes of conduct and training for judicial
nominating commissioners; and the method of retaining
judges after expiration of their term, including the opportunity
to evaluate their performance before the retention decision
through some form of judicial performance review. Symposium
participants sought to identify the best practices for commis-
sion-based appointment systems whether or not such practices
are currently in use in any state—including consideration of
foreign judicial systems19—to guide states that are considering
[D]etermining
which type of
appointive system
to employ has been
the subject of too 
little discussion.
Symposium
participants sought
to identify the best
practices for 
commission-based
appointment 
systems.
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appointment systems. These include states that are planning to
move from judicial elections to appointments or seeking to
improve their current method of judicial appointments.
The symposium also sought to refine the judicial selection
debate by defining what is meant by appointive systems—what
they are and what they can be. “[A]lmost all of the good gov-
ernment groups . . . support an ‘appointive’ system. If we start
with the assumption that an appointive system is the way to
go, how do we develop a good appointive system? What are
the mechanics?”20 Where there is a lack of definition, the
debate between supporters of electing judges and supporters of
appointing judges can be abstract or unclear. Some who chal-
lenge appointive systems assume that the term refers only to
the worst systems (e.g., elitist; closed or secretive; and non-
diverse), which no serious reformer would recommend.21 They
then infer from that assumption that no appointive system
works well. These flawed appointive systems include those in
which an executive appoints a judge without the intervention
of a judicial nominating commission or legislative consent to
limit or ratify, respectively, the executive’s choice. Without
such a commission or legislative approval process, a judgeship
may be more readily used as a form of patronage, with judicial
offices awarded as rewards to staffers and others close to the
appointing authority.22 The symposium focused on commis-
sion-based appointive systems only.
D. Designing the Best Appointive System
The Fordham symposium showed that no existing system
is likely to contain all the best elements for a commission-
based appointive system.  Proposing an appointive system is
therefore not a matter of looking around the country and ask-
ing which single appointive system is best, then accepting it.
Rather, those seeking to
adopt appointive systems
should determine which
elements work best and
therefore how the best sys-
tem should be designed.
An appointive system may
be considered through its
separate parts, some good,
some better; and a state
may select the best parts of
each such system or
develop improved parts of
its own. 
1. REGULATION AND
TRAINING OF
JUDICIAL
NOMINATING
COMMISSIONERS
Although there is much interest and debate concerning who
should select the judicial nominating commissioners in com-
mission-based appointive systems,23 the Fordham symposium
also considered other important questions, including how
judicial nominating commissioners should be regulated and
trained; what should be the code of conduct governing judicial
nominating commissioners; how violations of such a code
should be detected; and how the code should be enforced.24
Among other things, a code of conduct should limit com-
munications between the judicial nominating commissioners
and the appointing authority so as to avoid the possibility or
perception of control of the commission or commissioner(s)
[T]hose seeking to
adopt appointive
systems should
determine which
elements work best.
. . . [T]he Fordham
symposium 
considered . . . [for
example,] how 
judicial nominating
commissioners
should be regulated
and trained . . . .
20. John Caher, Cardozo: Fix Party Conventions to Fight Voter Non-
Participation, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 27, 2006 (quoting my description of
the purpose of the Fordham program). See also John Caher, By
Tapping Jones, Spitzer Reveals Hands-On Style of Picking Judges,
N.Y. L.J., Jan. 14, 2007 (quoting me as follows: “It is definitely not
enough for one to proclaim he supports appointing judges or even
that he supports appointing them through a commission, without
providing a detailed system….There is not just one system.”).
21. See Joyce Purnick, Metro Matters; A Judiciary in Disrepair (and
Denial), N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2005, at B1, quoting a New York State
Supreme Court justice, Queens County, as defining an appointive
system as one in which “elitist lawyers” select judges, as follows: 
No committee can guarantee morality. . . . I refuse to
concede to a white-shoe firm from a city bar. The public’s
right to elect its judges is supreme.
The flaw in the justice’s argument is that he defines the appointive
system as one which no serious reformer would propose, namely,
one in which elitist lawyers from “white-shoe” firms select judges.
See Norman L. Greene, Letter to the Editor, Judges in New York, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 7, 2005 at A32. In addition, an appointive system must
take account of diversity. See Leo M. Romero, Enhancing Diversity in
an Appointive System of Selecting Judges, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 485,
485 (2007) (“For an appointive system to be perceived as legiti-
mate, it must ensure that diversity is considered in nominating can-
didates and in appointing judges.”) (footnote omitted).
22. See John Caher, Outgoing Governor Names Aides, Backers to
Judgeships, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 14, 2006 (hereinafter, Caher, Outgoing
Governor) (outgoing New York Governor Pataki awards New York
Court of Claims judgeships to his lieutenant governor, the gover-
nor’s counsel and “several other politically connected lawyers” ).
Of course, patronage appointments may still occur if the legisla-
ture defers to the choices of the appointing authority or if the judi-
cial nominating commission, mistaking its function and failing to
act independently as required, does the same. The best appoint-
ment systems are commission based, with or without legislative
involvement.
23. Shira J. Goodman & Lynn A. Marks, A View from the Ground: A
Reform Group’s Perspective on the Ongoing Effort to Achieve Merit
Selection of Judges, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 425, 437 (2007) (“every-
one—from elected officials to average people in focus groups—
wants to know who will be appointing members of the nominat-
ing commission”), 439 (“’who picks the pickers’ often becomes a
labyrinth from which the reform effort cannot escape.”); Rachel
Paine Caufield, How the Pickers Pick: Finding a Set of Best Practices
for Judicial Nominating Commissions, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 163,
181 (2007) (referring to the existence of “extensive literature that
considers the composition of nominating commissions”).
24. Norman L. Greene, What Makes a Good Appointive System for the
Selection of State Court Judges: The Vision of the Symposium, 34
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 35, 51-70 (2007).
by the appointing author-
ity.25 Communications
should also be limited
between the commissioners
and those who appointed
them.  The commissioners
“represent the public in the
judicial selection process;
they are not agents or repre-
sentatives” of those who
selected them.26
Another theme of the
symposium was that training
of commissioners should be
mandated and regular, both before a commissioner begins work
and periodically thereafter.27 Knowing how to recruit and select
the best judicial candidates is a skill that may be learned by com-
missioners and is not innate.28 A judicial nominating commis-
sioner may learn (and ideally should be taught) how to seek
information about the candidates for judgeships and understand
how to evaluate the information once it has been obtained.29
The American Judicature Society has been in the forefront
in the training of commissioners.  For example, the American
Judicature Society provides a Handbook for Judicial Nominating
Commissioners and an accompanying educational program
called the Institute for Judicial Nominating Commissioners to
train commissioners.30 The Handbook assists commissioners
in determining whether candidates possess the desired quali-
ties for judicial office, including impartiality, integrity, good
judicial temperament (which implies “an absence of arrogance,
impatience, pomposity, irascibility, arbitrariness or tyranny”),31
industriousness, professional skills, social awareness, collegial-
ity, writing ability, decisiveness, speaking ability, administrative
ability, and interpersonal skills.32
States may also wish to have experience requirements for
both lawyer and non-lawyer members of the judicial nominat-
ing commission.33 In some less populated areas, the require-
ments may be reduced or made less stringent if necessary to
avoid unduly limiting the pool of available commissioners.
2. ACCOUNTABILITY AND JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE
REVIEW
a. Elections and Accountability
The Fordham symposium also focused on how to achieve
accountability in a commission-based appointive system.
Opponents of such systems sometimes contend that if the public
is precluded from voting judges out of office, the public will be
unable to hold the judges responsible for unacceptable perfor-
mance. This argument would theoretically not apply to
appointive systems with retention elections since the opportunity
to hold a judge accountable by ballot would supposedly remain,
although judges are rarely rejected in retention elections. 
Because voter participation in judicial elections is low and
voters often have no basis to determine which judges are per-
forming well or poorly without judicial performance review
(discussed below),34 judicial elections are logically a poor
method to achieve accountability, regardless whether they are
retention elections or contested elections.  It is self-evident
that voters who do not participate or are uninformed cannot
and do not hold judges accountable through elections.35 Many
judicial elections also have a single unopposed candidate, and
sitting judges may not have opponents, leaving no issues to be
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25. Greene, Perspectives, supra note 7, at 964; Norman L. Greene, The
Judicial Independence Through Fair Appointments Act, 34 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 13, 22-23 (2007) (creating a firewall for certain commu-
nications between the appointing authority and judicial nominat-
ing commissioners) (hereinafter, GREENE, Judicial Appointments
Act).
26. MARLA N. GREENSTEIN, HANDBOOK FOR JUDICIAL NOMINATING
COMMISSIONERS 12 (2d ed., rev’d by Kathleen M. Sampson, 2004).
See also GREENE, Judicial Appointments Act, supra note 25, at 23
(restrictions on communications between commissioners and
those who appointed them).
27. See GREENE, Judicial Appointments Act, supra note 25, at 24 (requir-
ing training of commissioners).
28. Donald L. Burnett, Jr., A Cancer on the Republic: The Assault Upon
Impartiality of State Courts and the Challenge to Judicial Selection,
34 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 265, 285-6 (2007). “[N]ominating com-
missions should undertake professionalized search processes sim-
ilar to those utilized by business organizations when hiring senior
executives, or by academic institutions when hiring senior admin-
istrators and tenure-track faculty members. The use of search con-
sultants could well be appropriate.” Id. at 286. 
29. Steven Zeidman, Careful What You Wish for: Tough Questions,
Honest Answers, and Innovative Approaches to Appointive Judicial
Selection, 34 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 473, 477-8 (2007) (hereinafter,
Zeidman, Careful). “[Y]our typical commission member is
unlikely to be an expert, or even particularly skilled, in this infor-
mation-gathering technique. Is she trained to design the questions
(including the more spontaneous follow-up questions), solicit the
A judicial 
nominating 
commissioner may
learn . . . how to
seek information
about the 
candidates . . . and
how to evaluate the
information once it
has been obtained.
answers, and then analyze the responses across candidates?” Id. at
477-8. “Supporters of appointive systems and nominating com-
missions must be honest—these information-gathering tech-
niques require great training, skill, and time.” Id. at 479.
30. GREENSTEIN, supra note 26, at 2. See also Caufield, supra, note 23.
31. GREENSTEIN, supra note 26, at 93 (citing Utah Application for
Judicial Office, which is quoted in part in the parenthetical in the
text). See also RICHARD A. WATSON & RONDAL G. DOWNING, THE
POLITICS OF THE BENCH AND THE BAR: JUDICIAL SELECTION UNDER THE
MISSOURI NONPARTISAN COURT PLAN 295 (1969) (dividing judicial
temperament into “‘open-mindedness and the ability to listen
patiently to both sides of the case’” and “‘courtesy to lawyers and
witnesses’”). 
32. GREENSTEIN, supra, note 26, at 89.
33. See Jesse Sunenblick, Pataki’s Puppets, JUDICIAL REPORTS, Dec. 8,
2006, http://www.judicialreports.com/archives/2006/12/patakis_
puppets.php, describing a paralegal selected as a judicial nomi-
nating commissioner for New York’s Court of Appeals and specu-
lating that her principal recommendation was that her husband is
the Kings County Conservative Party leader. Cf. GREENE, Judicial
Appointments Act, supra note 25, at 24 (establishing experience
requirements for commissioners).
34. SHARED EXPECTATIONS, supra note 14, at 3.
35. Kurt E. Scheuerman, Rethinking Judicial Elections, 72 OR. L. REV.
459, 477 (1993). This section considers the common circum-
stance of contested elections and retention elections without judi-
cial performance review. The use of judicial performance review
with retention elections is considered infra.
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36. DIANE D. BLAIR & JAY BARTH, ARKANSAS POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
237 (2d ed. 2005) (discussing Arkansas judicial elections and not-
ing that sometimes there is no “vigorous contest for first election
to the bench in which the qualifications, values, and views of all
contestants [are] highly publicized [in the first place]; and an
equally vigorous challenge when a judge [seeks] reelection, so his
or her performance could be evaluated.”). 
On November 7, 2006 in New York City, my polling place in
the 74th Election District had five judicial elections. Every single
candidate was unopposed. My voting machine presented a total of
five candidates for five positions, and I was invited to vote for all
five. There was no other choice, except not to vote. The ballot for
judges read substantially as follows:
1. Justice of the Supreme Court (vote for any two)
Angela M. Mazzarelli on Republican and Democratic Lines
Joan B. Lobis on Republican and Democratic Lines
2. Judge of the Civil Court – Countywide (vote for any one)
Jane Solomon
3. Judge of the Civil Court (vote for any two)
Eileen Rakower – on Democratic Line
Michael Stallman – on Republican and Democratic Lines
Only the above were judicial candidates. I had the identical
experience on the election ballot for November 2004, except that
there were nine candidates and I was invited to vote for any nine.
Greene, Perspectives, supra note 7, at 960.
37. BLAIR & BARTH, supra note 36, at 237. See also Lawrence H. Averill,
Jr., Observations on the Wyoming Experience with Merit Selection of
Judges: A Model for Arkansas, 17 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 281, 297
(1996). (“If elections were the result of the considered opinion of
the electorate, the election of judges might be a greatly preferred
technique. Experience and empirical research unfortunately
inform us that this is not the case. The vast majority of voters in
judicial elections are not adequately informed about the candi-
dates. Consequently, voters typically make decisions based on
very nonprofessional and meritless considerations. . .”).
38. SHARED EXPECTATIONS, supra note 14, at 3.
39. SHARED EXPECTATIONS, supra note 14, at 5. See generally Jean E.
Dubofsky, Judicial Performance Review: A Balance Between Judicial
Independence and Public Accountability, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 315
(2007).
40. SHARED EXPECTATIONS, supra note 14, at 2-3.
41. See e.g., Irwin & Real, Enriching, supra note 4, at 470; Dubofsky,
supra note 39, at 321-3 (collection of computerized information
about filed cases, survey information of those who appeared
before the judge, and other data). The references above to student
evaluations of professors and businesses of employees do not
mean that judges should be subject to the identical evaluation
techniques as professors and employees. Differences in the roles
of those persons, the type of information that must be gathered
and evaluated, and the public interest involving the judiciary
require separate ways to gather and analyze the information.
42. Colorado sends surveys as part of judicial performance review to
randomly selected persons in various categories of court users.
Dubofsky, supra note 39, at 322. Making it possible for such court
users to send in relevant information in advance of such surveys
may provide valuable supplemental information and lead to more
complete results than random surveys could.  There is no reason
for such persons to await the receipt of a survey before providing
relevant information on judicial performance. For Arizona’s judi-
cial performance review program, see Mark I. Harrison et al., On
the Validity and Vitality of Arizona’s Judicial Merit Selection System:
Past, Present, and Future, 34 FORDHAM URB. L. J.239, 245-247, 251-
259 (2007) (detailing Arizona’s judicial performance review pro-
gram). See also id. at 253: “In conducting its evaluations, the JPR
[judicial performance review] Commission [in Arizona] surveys
virtually everyone who has interacted with the judge in his or her
duties, including lawyers and judges’ staff, and, where applicable,
litigants, jurors, and witnesses.” 
discussed at all.36 This is not
merely a problem with reten-
tion elections, but also with
initial elections.37 Moreover,
since in many cases judicial
terms are much longer than
those of most elected offi-
cials, the opportunity to hold
a judge accountable through
the ballot—even if possi-
ble—is infrequent. Court
administrators and judicial
conduct commissions may
provide some accountability
before a judge’s term expires, subject to the limitations dis-
cussed below.
b. Judicial Performance Review in Appointive Systems
Supporters of appointive systems need not cede the issue of
accountability to supporters of judicial elections. Rather, propo-
nents of appointive selection may emphasize the potential for
accountability in appointive systems through a sophisticated
procedure known as judicial performance review. This proce-
dure “looks at how a judge treats people in the courtroom,
explains her decisions, manages her caseload, and adheres to
existing law. It then measures each judge’s performance in these
areas both in absolute terms against established benchmarks,
and relative to the performance of other judges.”38 In this pro-
cedure, an evaluation committee gathers detailed background
on each judge, including “survey data, review of case manage-
ment skills and written opinions, courtroom observation, and
information gained from interviews with the judge,” and dis-
seminates the evaluation report publicly.39 Using politically neu-
tral criteria, judicial performance evaluation asks,  “Is Judge X a
good judge because she treated all parties fairly, reached a deci-
sion supported by existing law, and explained her decision
clearly and thoroughly?” rather than is “Judge X a good judge
because she reached a particular result in that case.”40
For judicial performance review to have an effect on reten-
tion, the results of the review need to be disseminated to the
voters charged with retaining the candidates or not or to the
commissions evaluating them for reappointment.  Information
on judicial performance needs to be obtained from users of the
court system who have had experience with the judge, such as
lawyers, litigants, witnesses, judicial staff, and jurors.41 An ade-
quate review system requires an accessible record of users so
that relevant data may be collected, organized and dissemi-
nated. Information may sometimes be best collected at the
time of the contact between the user and the judge (or shortly
thereafter) when information is freshest in the user’s mind.42
[P]roponents of
appointive selection
may emphasize the
potential for
accountability in
appointive 
systems through 
. . . judicial 
performance
review.
43. Remarks of Professor Pamela Karlan, Stanford Law School,
Remarks at the Georgetown Law Center and American Law
Institute Conference: Fair and Independent Courts: A Conference on
the State of the Judiciary, Washington, D.C., Sept. 29, 2006,
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/news/documents/CoJ092906-kar-
lan.pdf  (hereinafter, Karlan Remarks). To the same effect, see
Mississippi Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Sanford, 941 So.
2d 209, 218 (Miss. 2006), available at http://www.mssc.state.
ms.us/Images/Opinions/CO37615.pdf,  at 16 (proceeding against
Justice Court judge in Mississippi; noting that “Justice courts will
ordinarily have a much greater volume of cases than our state trial
courts or appellate courts. Our citizenry’s overall perception of the
entire judicial system in this state is quite often a result of contact
with our justice courts, since the vast majority of our citizens will
have little or no contact with our state trial or appellate courts,
other than for jury service.”).
44. In an exceptional situation, a nominee for a federal judgeship in
the Eastern District of New York, now Judge Dora Irizarry, how-
ever, was subject to detailed, negative bar comment for tempera-
ment issues. Raymond Hernandez, Pataki Choice for Judgeship Is
Assailed, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2003, at B1; Michael Cooper,
Governor Defends His Embattled Choice for a Federal Judgeship,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2003 at B4; Norman L. Greene, Letter to the
Editor, Courtroom Courtesy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2003 at A16 (let-
ter to the editor on Irizarry matter). Nonetheless, with New York
senatorial and gubernatorial support, the candidate was con-
firmed as a judge by the United States Senate. See also Editorial,
Pataki’s Controversial Federal Judge, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2004, at
A15. Cf. Zeidman, Careful, supra note 29 at 478 (“Quickly, I came
to realize that the legal community has its own pinstripe version
of the police department’s oft-noted ‘blue wall of silence.’ It was
extremely uncommon for anyone to have anything particularly
critical to say. In short order I came to more fully appreciate the
phrase ‘damning with faint praise.’”)
45. To the extent that commission ratings can sometimes be erratic,
consider the description of a fictional judge of a music contest
where it was common knowledge that the ratings are questionable
but no one protests the “consensual hoax”:
The best mode of dissemination may depend on available
resources and local needs and may include such forms as the
internet, the press, and mail. Finally, public education will be
needed to motivate the public to consider the evaluative infor-
mation that has been gathered, understand its significance, and
act upon it. 
Reviews need not only be conducted near the end of the
judge’s term to provide voters or commissions screening or
nominating judges with enough information needed to reach
decisions on retention of the judge. Midterm reviews may also
be conducted, and if desired, shared only with the judge.
Without midterm reviews, a judge may receive only limited
feedback and therefore may lack the normal evaluative infor-
mation, which might lead her to change and improve.
Without a formal judicial performance review procedure,
judicial accountability may rest on various ad hoc measures.
For instance, a witness to such negative judicial performance
(such as a lawyer, juror, or a judge) may file a complaint about
it or a newspaper reporter may cover it. However, a complaint
may never become public even if substantiated; and, in any
event, it may not be pursued by public authorities in a public
manner. The conduct may not bear on a judge’s fitness to serve
(an issue for the judicial conduct commission), but it may bear
on whether the judge should be retained (an issue for voters in
retention elections or commissions charged with renominating
judges). Nor is the press the answer.  Many examples of poor
performance are not newsworthy and therefore may not be
covered. Also, reliance on episodic information cannot provide
the systematic collection of information that judicial perfor-
mance review requires. 
Furthermore, conventional wisdom is that some are reluc-
tant to report unprofessional conduct of judges to the author-
ities. Among their possible concerns are that the report may
not remain confidential and find some way back to the judge
and that the judge who is the subject of the complaint may
retaliate. To address these concerns, safe and confidential
channels should be created for witnesses to report such infor-
mation, and witnesses should be protected from retaliation.
Judges themselves may be reluctant to report unprofes-
sional judicial conduct by
their colleagues. Yet judges
may have an institutional
incentive to address prob-
lems with their peers for the
benefit of the court system.
The public is too likely to
equate problems with indi-
vidual judges anywhere
with problems of all judges
everywhere. “[P]eople tend
to mix all courts together. If
their experience with a
judge is that judge is biased
and ignorant, they’re not
going to assume other
judges are better.”43
Although private organizations such as bar associations or
political parties sometimes evaluate judges, such evaluations
may fall short compared to judicial performance reviews. For
example, these private evaluations may commonly share
some or all of the following deficiencies: the use of vague and
unpublished criteria or untrained evaluators for making eval-
uations; the receipt of reluctant or guarded responses from
sources of information who may be fearful of disclosure
(even if information given is promised to be kept confiden-
tial); the absence of a systematic method for collecting infor-
mation from those with experience before the judge (and
thus having insufficient data); a lack of sufficient time or
resources for the evaluators to obtain adequate information
on the judge; a lack of public trust in the evaluation process
because of a lack of transparency or public input in the
process; the use of opaque recommendations and conclusions
about a judge, such as blank statements of “qualified,” which
tell the public little about the judge and certainly nothing
about the raters’ reasons for providing the recommenda-
tions;44 and the presence of apparently inconsistent or arbi-
trary results, with candidates with similar attributes being
rated differently.45 In addition, although some political par-
Without a 
formal judicial 
performance review
procedure, judicial
accountability may
rest on various ad
hoc measures [and
lack the] systematic
collection of 
information [on]
judicial performance
[that is required].
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There is not even a proper scoring form, just a ream of
Tawside Council-headed notepaper on which I draw four
columns then circulate it to the other judges, indicating
that they do the same. We shall mark separately for tech-
nique, interpretation and musicality. . . . Add the marks
together, divide by three, top average is the winner. 
I have done this sort of thing before and never with an
easy conscience.…There is no fair way to rate a winsome
ten-year-old against a pimply matriculant, and on differ-
ent instruments to boot. Injustice is inbuilt, but the pub-
lic demands a winner and we must deliver one. Everyone
knows the system is rotten, but we perpetrate a consen-
sual hoax in the hope of filching a few prime-time seconds
to remind viewers that there are greater heights in life than
politics, sport and popstardom.
NORMAN LEBRECHT, THE SONG OF NAMES 26 (2002).
46. See Editorial, The City: Brooklyn’s Lessons, NY TIMES, June 10,
2007 (“[C]andidates in some counties will be screened by inde-
pendent expert panels. That could help a bit. But while the panels
will vet candidates the party leaders will still make the final
choices…. Eventually the court or the legislature will conclude
that it simply isn’t right to pack the courts with cronies, even vet-
ted ones.”)
47. See Lopez Torres v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 411 F. Supp. 2d 212
(E.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 462 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S.
Ct. 1325 (2007). 
48. See Sam Skolnik, Taking Cash Power Out of the Judiciary: Court
Reformers Want Judges to Be Appointed, at Least at the Beginning,
LAS VEGAS SUN, Mar. 20, 2007, available at http://www.lasvegas-
sun.com/sunbin/stories/sun/2007/mar/20/566610617.html
(Nevada proposed constitutional amendment to appoint judges,
with a judicial performance evaluation plan); Sam Skolnik, Judges
Win Again and Again: Bill’s Revival Might Limit Voters’ Say on Who
Serves on the Bench, LAS VEGAS SUN, June 7, 2007 (Nevada Senate
passes appointive selection proposal; second passage required
plus voter approval), available at http://politics.lasvegassun.
com/2007/06/bills_revival_m.html; and Citizens Commission,
Final Report, supra note 3, at 16 (Minnesota commission proposal
to appoint judges, with a judicial performance evaluation plan).
For an overview of judicial performance evaluation, see Rebecca
Love Kourlis and Jordan M. Singer, Using Judicial Performance
Evaluations to Promote Judicial Accountability, 90 JUDICATURE 200
(2007).
49. SHARED EXPECTATIONS, supra note 14, at 4.
50. Jean E. Dubofsky, supra note 39, at 339; SHARED EXPECTATIONS,
supra note 14, at 76-78. 
51. Zeidman, Careful, supra note 29, at 481-2.
52. Id. at 482.
53. Marc T. Amy, Judiciary School: A Proposal for a Pre-Judicial L.L.M.
Degree, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 130, 134 (2002). See also Zeidman,
Careful, supra note 29, at 482. 
ties have established screen-
ing panels to evaluate candi-
dates, it is unclear whether
the screening is fairly con-
ducted or influenced by
political party leaders.46
Furthermore, political party
screening panels may not
function under articulated
and enforceable rules, much
less transparently.47
Without judicial perfor-
mance review, the judiciary
lacks the type of procedure
applied in many business organizations, with “merit” raises
and evaluations, or even in a classroom, with student evalu-
ations of professors. This does not mean that business orga-
nizations always function fairly, that evaluations are consis-
tently reasonable and appropriate, and that raises are fairly
and scientifically (as opposed to whimsically or invidiously)
distributed.  Nor need it be argued, of course, that judges
should be awarded merit increases (as opposed to having
fixed salaries) or made employees at will (instead of having
guaranteed or life terms). Rather, this article only observes
that judges, whose performance is a matter of great public
concern, should be subject to improved evaluation tech-
niques and in some states that is happening already.48 A
recent report explained why the public and the judges them-
selves will benefit from judicial performance evaluation, as
follows:
[Judicial performance review] is, at heart, no different
than the routine performance evaluations that many
Americans encounter in their own jobs. It is an opportu-
nity to assess periodically a worker’s strengths and weak-
nesses, and make sure that the “employee” and the
“employer” are focused on the same goals. Just as an
employee who performs well on her evaluation can con-
gratulate herself on a job well done, judges who receive
strong evaluations can be confident that their
approaches to the job are effective. Conversely, just as an
employee who rates poorly in some areas understands
the need to improve, judges who do not perform well in
certain areas will recognize the need to do better. Just as
workplace evaluations lead to more efficient and more
confident employees, judicial evaluations can lead to
more effective and productive courts.49
Judges may also benefit from favorable judicial perfor-
mance review when attacked in retention elections for their
decision making.50
3. PRE-JUDICIAL EDUCATION—SHALL THE LAW
SCHOOLS DEVELOP A PROGRAM?
The subjects of judicial education and examinations were
raised by the Fordham symposium. Possible suggestions
included a judicial training program (or “judicial studies
graduate school”) or a test like a bar examination.51
Observations were made about the international experience
where judges must pass through “academic and practical
training.”52 Although judges in the United States are not typ-
ically required to complete any courses before becoming
judges today, judging is a skill that arguably may be enhanced
through education before judicial service begins. Most of the
available educational offerings today are “in-service and con-
tinuing professional education for judges already selected and
serving.”53 To correct any deficiencies in judicial education,
[J]udges, whose
performance is a
matter of great
public concern,
should be subject
to improved 
evaluation 
techniques and in
some states that is
happening already.
54. Amy, supra note 53 at 130-131 (suggesting that educators should
consider making available degree programs or courses in the judi-
cial process for prospective judges). Some undergraduate law
schools or continuing legal education providers may be concerned
whether there would be interest in such courses from those who
are not yet judges and may never be judges. This obviously needs
to be explored. One suggestion might be for law schools to cross-
list the courses with a political science department if the law
school is part of a university or to offer them every other year. The
cross-listing might increase the numbers of students available by
drawing from two separate schools. 
55. See New York City Bar Ass’n, Recommendation on the Selection of
Judges and the Improvement of the Judicial Selection System in
New York State (2006), http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/
Judicial_Selection_TaskForceReport_Dec2006.pdf (hereinafter,
NYC Bar Report); ACTION UNIT NO. 4, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, A
MODEL PLAN FOR IMPLEMENTING THE NEW YORK STATE BAR
ASSOCIATION’S PRINCIPLES FOR SELECTING JUDGES (1993),
http://www.nysba.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Attorney_Resourc
es/Legislation/NYSBA_Model_Plan_for_selecting_judges.pdf
(hereinafter, the NYSBA 1993 Plan), and N.Y. State Bar Ass’n,
Memorandum, Jan. 23, 2007, http://www.nysba.org/Content/
NavigationMenu/Attorney_Resources/Legislation/MeritSelection.p
df (hereinafter, NYSBA 2007 Plan); and see John Caher, State Bar
Offers Two Plans to Reform Judge Selections, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 23, 2007;
and New York County Lawyers Ass’n, Judicial Selection in New York
State: A Roadmap to Reform, May 8, 2006, http://www.nycla.org/
siteFiles/Publications/Publications248_0.pdf (hereinafter, NYCLA
Report). The NYC Bar Report was republished in 62 Rec. 89
(2007). Citations to the NYC Bar Report in this article are to the
report individually online, not to The Record. The NYC Bar Report
as published in The Record is also available at
http://www.nycbar.org/Publications/record/vol_62%20 _no_1.pdf
56. See generally Table 2 (Composition of Nominating Commission) of
AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION: CURRENT
STATUS (2003), http://www.ajs.org/js/JudicialMerit Charts.pdf
(describing state by state how nominating commissions are
selected). Other variations involve the election of a certain number
of judicial nominating commissioners by bar association members,
such as in the case of Missouri, members of the Missouri bar. See
http://www.ajs.org/js/MO_methods.htm It is unclear why, if elec-
tions are a poor way to select judges, they are a reasonable way to
select judicial nominating commissioners. Many factors, however,
affect the proper functioning of judicial nominating commissions,
including the rules and regulations governing their operations and
the abilities of the commissioners. See also Zeidman, Careful, supra
note 29, at 479 (asking “how we can select commissioners who,
within the necessary framework of diversity, are best able to per-
form the commission’s stated task. Who are the best qualified to
evaluate who are the best qualified for the bench?”)
57. Greene, Perspectives, supra note 7, at 962-3; Norman L. Greene,
Perspectives on Judicial Selection Reform: The Need to Develop a
Model Appointive Selection Plan for Judges in Light of Experience, 68
ALB. L. REV. 597, 605 (2005).
58. See Caher, Outgoing Governor, supra note 22. The article dealt with
appointments to the New York Court of Claims where there is no
judicial nominating commission restricting the governor’s power
to select judges. The governor’s selections included persons
notably close to him politically. This is an example of what may
occur if a governor selects without a commission and even where
a commission exists but is subservient or obedient to a governor’s
wishes. The governor’s control over the selection of commission-
ers, of course, need not require the commissioners to follow the
governor’s wishes once selected; however, the structure of the
commission may lead to the impression that that is occurring.
59. NYC Bar Report, supra note 55. 
60. See generally Table 2 (Composition of Nominating Commission)
of AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, supra note 56.
legal educators may need to consider precisely how and which
opportunities for judicial education may be provided. 54
E. Unifying the Reform Movement on 
Appointive Systems
Various bar associations and other organizations have sup-
ported appointing judges. Obtaining consensus within the
reform movement on how an appointive plan should be
designed is a different matter. In New York, for instance, three
bar associations, the New York City Bar Association, the New
York County Lawyers Association, and the New York State Bar
Association, have each proposed different plans for appointing
judges, with varying degrees of detail.55 A common area of
contention involves how to select the judicial nominating
commission. The American Judicature Society website, which
describes a number of state plans, reflects a general practice
that elected officials select the commissioners, with commis-
sioners including both lawyers and non-lawyers. 56 However,
in some instances, a limited number of commissioners may be
selected not by elected officials but by other methods, includ-
ing by law schools or bar associations. 
Some plans permit a large number of selections to be made
by the appointing authority, others permit fewer. The disad-
vantage of allowing a substantial number of selections by the
appointing authority is that it
may create the perception that
the authority controls the
process. This may in turn
cause a decline in applications
to the judicial nominating
commission except by persons
close to the appointing
authority;57 where the
appointing authority has sub-
stantial control over the selec-
tion of nominating commis-
sions, cronyism and political
rewards may be perceived as
determining judicial selection.58
A New York City Bar Association task force report pro-
posed a plan, which has various public officials selecting
unspecified organizations and the organizations selecting all
the commissioners.59 No state appointment plan relies exclu-
sively (much less heavily) on organizations to select commis-
sioners.60 For example, some states use bar associations for
the selection of certain commissioners, and New York City
currently provides for 2 out of 19 commissioners for nomi-
nating New York City judges to be selected by law-school
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61. City of New York, Mayor’s Advisory Committee on the Judiciary,
Exec. Order No. 8, § 5(a), Mar. 4, 2002, http://www.nyc.gov/
html/acj/downloads/pdf/exec_order_8.pdf. Although the law
schools may nominate candidates for the commission, the Mayor
has the right to approve or disapprove the nominated candidates
or request additional candidates. Id. at §5(a).
62. NYCLA Report, supra note 55, at 9; NYSBA Report, supra note 55,
at 5.
63. NYC Bar Report, supra note 55, at 19-20.
64. NYCLA Report, supra note 55, at 11; NYC Bar Report, supra note
55, at 19.
65. See NYSBA 1993 Plan, supra note 55, at 16 (providing for reten-
tion elections). The NYSBA 1993 Plan, however, was older than
the NYCLA Report and NYC Bar Report, and it predated some
politicized retention elections, such as that involving the 1996
rejection of former Tennessee Supreme Court Justice Penny
White. See Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on the Judiciary: Can
Justice Be Done Amid Efforts to Intimidate and Remove Judges from
Office for Unpopular Decisions? 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 308, 313 et seq.
(1997). The NYSBA 2007 Plan abandoned retention elections. 
66. See Press Release, New York State Bar Association Endorses
Governor Spitzer’s Merit Selection Plan, June 20, 2007, available at
http://www.readmedia.com/news/show/New_York_State_Bar_Ass
ociation_Endorses_Governor_Spitzer_s_Merit_Selection_Plan/20
72. The governor’s plan has important principles in common with
prior bar association commission-based appointive selection plans
as well as other classic appointive selection plans and presents a
promising opportunity for New York judicial selection reform.
Analyzing the details of the governor’s plan and suggesting refine-
ments are beyond the scope of this article.
67. Greene, Judicial Appointments Act, supra note 25.
68. If legislative ratification is required, a provision is needed to deal
with the situation in which the legislature rejects the nominee of
the appointing authority. An issue is whether following a rejec-
tion, the appointing authority is limited to selecting from the
remaining nominees or whether an additional nominee should be
added. A better policy is for the judicial nominating commission
to add a nominee after a rejection lest the legislature be in a posi-
tion to keep rejecting nominees until the appointing authority is
forced to select the one the legislature favors.
deans, subject to the
mayor’s approval.61 A plan
relying exclusively on
organizations to select
commissioners would,
among other things, leave
no one person accountable
for the ultimate choices.
An appointing authority
would merely select an
organization, and if the
organization selected an
unqualified person, the
appointing authority could
not be blamed and could shift criticism to the organization. 
The roles of appointing authorities vary in judicial selection
reform plans as well. The New York State Bar and the New York
County Lawyers Association plans have local authorities
appointing many judges with local jurisdiction.62 In contrast,
the New York City Bar plan has the governor appointing local
judges outside New York City, with the mayor selecting local
judges within New York City.63 Moreover, the New York City
Bar and New York County Lawyers Association plans provide
for commission-based reappointment for appointing judges
after the conclusion of their terms;64 until recently, the New
York State Bar Association plan proposed retention elections,
but it now has apparently abandoned them.65
Advocates of appointive plans may need to consider not
only which type of plan is likely to be accepted, but also
which plan works well; and these may be two different things.
For example, it may be easier in some circumstances to get the
governor’s support for a plan by allowing him to control the
selection of all or most of the judicial nominating commis-
sioners. But the cost of doing so may be a plan which is func-
tionally indistinguishable from a plan in which a governor
selects nominees unilaterally, and that is an invitation for
political patronage. 
One potential unifying factor among the reformers would
be the presence of credible proposed legislation supporting
appointive selection. Thus in May or June 2007 when New
York State Governor Eliot Spitzer proposed Program Bill No.
34, which contained a constitutional amendment for a com-
mission-based appointment plan, the New York State Bar
Association promptly issued a press release supporting the
plan and seeking its approval and wrote a letter to New York
State legislators accordingly. 66
F. A Model Judicial Selection by Appointment Act
The Fordham Urban Law Journal published in its sympo-
sium issue my model act for judicial selection by appoint-
ment.67 This model act borrows from some existing plans of
judicial selection by appointment and contains various inno-
vations. Since it is a model act, it provides jurisdiction-
dependent alternatives, which may be used without disturb-
ing the integrity of the overall structure. For example, vari-
ations might include the number of judicial nominating
commissions and commissioners, the extent to which com-
mission proceedings are kept confidential, and the existence
of legislative ratification of judicial appointments.68
The model act addresses many matters discussed at the
symposium, including establishment of judicial nominating
commissions to propose candidates for an appointing author-
ity to select from; use of multiple nominating commissions to
permit statewide and local authorities to select judges (i.e.,
decentralizing the nominating and appointing functions);
specification of criteria to be considered by judicial nominat-
ing commissions in proposing nominees; identification of the
persons who should select judicial nominating commission-
ers; safeguards to prevent appointing authorities from con-
trolling the commissions by limiting their communications
with commissioners (essentially establishing a firewall), with
sanctions for breach; required training of judicial nominating
commissioners; a code of conduct and rules of procedure for
judicial nominating commissioners; a mandate that diversity
be considered by judicial nominating commissioners; over-
sight over the judicial nominating commissioners by a judi-
The Fordham . . .
symposium issue
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act for judicial 
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cial nominating review commission to ensure compliance
with legislative mandates; judicial performance review for
judges seeking retention or reappointment (an important ele-
ment of any appointment plan); and reselection by a com-
mission rather than by retention elections, following sub-
stantial public input.69
As did the symposium presentations and other articles, the
model seeks to point the way to the development of a good
appointive system, which is not only likely to be passed but
also likely to serve the states’ purposes in attracting and retain-
ing qualified judges. In the next section, this article will con-
sider a substandard judiciary consisting primarily of non-
lawyer judges governing New York’s Town and Village Courts.
II. NON-LAWYER JUDGES: THE CASE OF NEW YORK’S
ELECTED TOWN AND VILLAGE COURTS 
Recent criticisms of the courts…have “highlighted
some problems that have existed for some time.”. . .
The [New York S]tate’s Commission on Judicial
Conduct has said that…investigation of misconduct by
the town and village justices consumes a large share of
its resources.... [T]he president of the State Magistrates
Association, the justices’ organization, said he knew of
no need to give court officials more power to oversee
the justice courts.70
[L]awyers and officials said they could not publicly
challenge the [town or village] justice because of his
power here.71
What is being done about those [Town and Village]
Courts?72
A. Introduction
The preceding section considered systems best suited to
identify, select, and retain the judges who are most likely to
perform well in their judicial roles. This section addresses
69. Greene, Judicial Appointments Act, supra note 25. In addition to
the model provisions, other reforms are possible. For instance, a
state may provide that vacancies on judicial nominating commis-
sions must be advertised so that qualified persons will have an
opportunity to apply. See e.g., Maute, supra note 19, at 412
(describing British nominating commission as follows:
“Commissioners must be selected through an open application
process….). In addition, judicial nominating commissioners may
be required to take an oath of office committing themselves to
comply with the legislative or administrative scheme for the com-
mission.
70. William Glaberson, Senate to Review Oversight of Town Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 12, 2006, at B2 (hereinafter, Glaberson, Oversight).
71. William Glaberson, A Small-Town Judge’s Personal Justice Stirs
Concern and Attracts Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2006, at B8
(hereinafter, Glaberson, Personal Justice).
72. Paraphrase of comment by a United States Supreme Court justice
to the author in September 2006 after the justice read a New York
Times article on the Town and Village Courts. The name is with-
held because the comment was “off-the-record.”
73. William Glaberson, Broken Bench: In Tiny Courts of N.Y., Abuses of
Law and Power, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2006 (hereinafter, Glaberson,
Tiny Courts); William Glaberson, Broken Bench: Small-Town
Justice, with Trial and Error, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2006; and
William Glaberson, Broken Bench: How a Reviled Court System Has
Outlasted Critics, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2006. 
74. New York State Unified Court System, Action Plan for the Justice
Courts, Nov. 2006, http://www.courts.state.ny.us/publications/
pdfs/ActionPlan-JusticeCourts.pdf , at 14 (hereinafter, Town and
Village Report).
75. Town and Village Report, supra note 74, at 10. The New York State
Constitution authorizes non-lawyers to serve as judges. Id.
76. Town and Village Report, supra note 74, at 8. There are 1,277 of
these courts in “925 towns and 352 villages ranging from sparsely
populated rural municipalities to densely populated suburban
localities with over 100,000 residents and many characteristics of
mid-sized cities.” Id. The courts are also the subject of task forces
of the Fund for Modern Courts and New York City Bar
Association and a study by the Special Commission on the Future
of the New York State Courts. See http://www.moderncourts.org/
Advocacy/town/index.html, http://www.abcny.org/PressRoom/
PressRelease/2006_1027.htm and http://www.nycourtreform.org/
notices.shtml.
77. Town and Village Report, supra note 74, at 8.
courts in New York (as in
other states) in which judges
lack the basic credentials of a
law degree and legal experi-
ence and yet still serve on the
bench in some courts of lim-
ited jurisdiction. Among
other things, it will set forth
some of the serious problems
reported about the judges and
the courts, ongoing efforts to
address them, and the outlook for such courts, including
whether they should be permitted to continue with non-attor-
ney judges and, if so, why. 
B. The New York Times Series
The Town and Village Courts became a national story when
“exposed” in a series of articles in the New York Times in the
fall of 2006;73 however, the word “exposed” is not intended to
connote “discovered.” Problems with these courts have long
been known. “During the last 50 years in particular, observers
have expressed dissatisfaction with the lay judge system,
asserting that non-attorney judges inherently lack the requisite
training to ensure due process and enforce other critical con-
stitutional and statutory protections.”74 Non-lawyer judges
obviously could not pass through a legitimate judicial nomi-
nating commission applying normal criteria for selection as a
judge—especially graduation from an accredited law school.
According to New York’s 2006 report on these courts, 72% of
the nearly 2000 Town and Village Court judges are non-
lawyers.75
The Town and Village Courts are New York’s “most numer-
ous and diverse trial courts, [l]ocated in all 57 counties outside
New York City”76 and provide “accessible venues to resolve
criminal and civil disputes pursuant to State law:”77
[They] enjoy the same criminal jurisdiction as any
other “local criminal court,” including the Criminal
[J]udges [in some
courts] lack the
basic credentials of
a law degree and
legal experience
and yet still serve
on the bench. . . .
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78. Town and Village Report, supra note 74, at 8 (footnotes omitted).
Their civil jurisdiction includes “civil actions where the amount
in controversy does not exceed $3,000 exclusive of interest and
costs, and may grant orders of protection and other relief in sen-
sitive disputes that might be adjudicated in Family Court.” Id. at
2. They also handle summary landlord-tenant proceedings. Id. at
9. In both civil and criminal cases, they “must be prepared to
select fair juries, appoint interpreters, decide pre-trial motions,
conduct trials, render evidentiary rulings, issue written opinions,
prepare records of proceedings for appellate review and generally
supervise the effective operation of their courts.” Id. at 9.
79. Karlan Remarks, supra note 43. 
80. Other states that appear to have non-lawyer judges in some
courts, according to the American Judicature Society’s website,
www.ajs.org, include Colorado, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Nevada, New Mexico, and Texas.  This is not intended to be an
exclusive list of affected states, all of which may be compiled from
the website.
81. Glaberson, Tiny Courts, supra note 73.
82. Glaberson, Tiny Courts, supra note 73.
83. Glaberson, Tiny Courts, supra note 73.
84. Glaberson, Personal Justice, supra note 71.
85. Glaberson, Personal Justice, supra note 71. The judge attended col-
Court of the City of New
York, the City Courts out-
side New York City and
the District Courts of
Nassau and western
Suffolk Counties on Long
Island. By investing in
them such broad criminal
jurisdiction, the
Legislature empowered
the [courts] to arraign all
crimes (including the most serious felonies) allegedly
committed in the locality, and to adjudicate misde-
meanors, traffic infractions and other violations.78
Although the New York Times series is about “the lowest tier
in New York’s state system,” the situation is not anomalous: it
is “a tier that is replicated in many other states of the coun-
try.”79 Non-lawyer judges reportedly serve in many states
besides New York.80
The New York Times articles on these judges were critical (if
not scathing), one quoting a judge as follows: “‘I just follow my
own common sense….And the hell with the law.’”81 As the
New York Times found, there was a pattern of poor judicial per-
formance typified by either ignorance of the law or a willing-
ness to overlook it. “Many [town and village justices] do not
know or seem to care what the law is. Justices are not screened
for competence, temperament or even reading ability. The only
requirement is that they be elected.”82 The Times article further
indicated of the judges that “[M]any—truck drivers, sewer
workers or laborers—have scant grasp of the most basic legal
principles. Some never got through high school, and at least
one went no further than grade school.”83 Among the many
problems documented in the exposé included “justices [in
Town and Village Courts who] have illegally jailed people,
threatened their enemies, protected their friends and made
grievous legal errors, with little supervision or penalty. The law
often counts for little, because three-quarters of the justices are
not lawyers.”84 Another judge holds sway through fear: “[Town
and Village Court] Judge Head rules Keeseville, and God help
you if you oppose him….”85 As the Times commented, “It is
impossible to say just how many of those [Town and Village
Court] justices are ill-informed or abusive.”86
The Times pointed out that New York “demands more
schooling for licensed manicurists and hair stylists” than for
these local judges.87 New York’s Chief Judge Judith Kaye spot-
lighted the problem of lack of training as well. Commenting in
a 1983 dissent on the minimal training of the judges, then New
York Court of Appeals Judge Judith Kaye noted, that “[d]espite
the courses prescribed for nonlawyer Town and Village
Justices, their training in the law, and especially their exposure
to the complexities of a criminal jury trial, do not approach a
law school education and experience at the Bar.”88 As Judge
Kaye wrote, the use of non-lawyer judges endangers the rights
of criminal defendants: 
Appellant, facing the possible deprivation of his lib-
erty, had the right to trial before a law-trained Judge
[citation omitted]. The right to effective assistance of
counsel and the right to trial by jury, both so jealously
guarded, lose force without a law-trained Judge to
insure that motions are disposed of in accordance with
the law, that evidentiary objections are properly ruled
on, and that the jury is correctly instructed....Because
of the technical knowledge required to insure that
defendants facing imprisonment are afforded a full
measure of the rights provided to them, use of non-
law-trained Judges is a procedure that “involves such a
probability that prejudice will result that it is deemed
inherently lacking in due process.”89
lege without graduating and had no law degree; “the only training
that New York has given its justices for decades is six days of ini-
tial schooling and an annual refresher course.” Id.
86. Glaberson, Tiny Courts, supra note 73.
87. Glaberson, Tiny Courts, supra note 73. The judges have reportedly
been required to receive less training than hair-removal-waxing
technicians, nails specialists, and massage therapists. See Mark
Alcott, President, New York State Bar Association, Testimony
Before the New York State Assembly Committees on Judiciary and
Codes: Reform of the New York State Justice Courts, Dec. 14,
2006, at 2-3 http://www.nysba.org/Content/Navigation
Menu/About_NYSBA/Presidents_Page/JusticeCourtReformTestim
ony.pdf
88. People v. Charles F., 60 N.Y.2d 478, 470 N.Y.S.2d 342, 345 (1983)
(Kaye, dissenting), cert. denied sub nom. Charles F. v. New York,
467 U.S. 1216 (1984). 
89. People v. Charles F., 470 N.Y.S.2d at 344-5 (Kaye, dissenting,
quoting from Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965))  (citation omit-
ted).  The majority held that the defendant had no absolute due-
process right under New York or federal law to trial before a judge
who is a lawyer. This was the sole basis upon which the defendant
had sought to appeal his conviction.
New York
“demands more
schooling for
licensed manicurists
and hair stylists”
than for these local
judges.
90. Although rights in civil and criminal litigation may be different in
various respects (such as the right to counsel), the American civil
legal system arguably should require a law-trained judge in civil
cases as well.
91. Charles F., 470 N.Y.S.2d at 345 (Kaye, dissenting).
92. The New York City Bar Association Task Force on Town and
Village Courts, Recommendations Relating to Training for Town and
Village Justices and Court Clerks, June 11, 2007, at 3 (hereinafter,
Training Recommendations), available at http://www.nycbar.org/25
_recommendations.htm.
93. Training Recommendations, supra note 92, at 7-8. The stated mis-
sion of the New York State Judicial Institute is to serve as a “cen-
ter for education and research designed to enhance the quality of
the courts and ensure that the New York State Judiciary sets the
standard for judicial excellence around the country”
(http://law.pace.edu/JI/index.html). The New York City Bar
Association Task Force has issued several reports, which appear to
be interim in nature. Besides Training Recommendations, the Task
Force has issued New York City Bar Association Task Force on
Town and Village Courts, Memorandum on Justice Court
Technology, Mar. 6, 2007, and New York City Bar Association Task
Force on Town and Village Courts, Recommendations Relating to
Assisting Town and Village Justices, June 11, 2007 (hereinafter,
Assisting Justices). The reports are expressly stated to be interim in
nature since they “do not preclude further investigation by the
Task Force and recommendations for structural or organizational
changes in the Town and Village Courts.” Assisting Justices, at 1.
Training Recommendations, at 1, adds, to the same effect, that rec-
ommended “development of extensive training programs” are not
viewed by the Task Force “as a substitute for changes in structure,
jurisdiction, or funding source if such changes are shown to be
needed after our study is complete….[N]o assumption will be
made that these [training] recommendations are all that is
required for the long run.” All the New York City Bar Association
Task Force reports mentioned in this article are available at
http://www.nycbar.org/25_recommendations.htm, as is the final
Task Force report, Recommendations Relating to Structure and
Organization (Oct. 30, 2007).
94. The New York Times described its methodology as follows: 
…The Times reviewed public documents dating back
decades and, unannounced, visited courts in every part of
the state. It examined records of closed disciplinary hear-
ings. It tracked down defendants, and interviewed prose-
cutors and defense lawyers, plaintiffs and bystanders. The
examination found overwhelming evidence that decade
after decade and up to this day, people have often been
denied fundamental legal rights.
Glaberson, Tiny Courts, supra note 73.
The same should apply to civil litigants whose rights and
property also may be jeopardized by non-lawyer judges.90 As
Judge Kaye noted, “‘a lay person, regardless of his educational
qualifications or experience, is not a constitutionally accept-
able substitute for a member of the Bar.’”91
The foregoing is not intended to suggest that a law degree and
experience at the bar guarantee that a person will be a good
judge, and one must concede that some with such credentials are
not good judges. One may likewise concede that some non-attor-
ney judges may handle cases well. Society commonly relies on
education and experience to indicate minimal competence in the
field, however, and it is reasonable to require them. A medical
degree does not ensure that one is a good doctor, but it is neces-
sary for one to practice medicine, subject to other applicable pro-
fessional licensing requirements.
But degree and experience aside, the evidence is growing
and perhaps irrefutable that the non-attorney judges lack the
knowledge to do their jobs. A New York City Bar Association
Task Force on Town and Village Courts’ report on the judges
thus states in sweeping fashion:
Interviews and responses to questionnaires distrib-
uted by the Task Force reflect the almost unanimous
view that the training and education program until
now is deficient and that the justices do not have ade-
quate knowledge about most of the relevant laws, con-
stitutional guarantees, and legal procedures, including
substantive law, pretrial and trial procedures, ethics
rules, administrative functions, fiscal responsibilities,
rules of evidence and presumptions.92
This paragraph identifies so much that the justices may not
know that one must wonder what, if any, important matters
they do know. According to the task force, more training is in
order. But the task force also cites a comment by New York’s
Judicial Institute to the effect that
whatever training is given to the
justices must be simplified: i.e.,
“what is critical for the project is
that those who make presenta-
tions be capable of teaching an
audience of non-lawyers whose
education ranges from high
school graduates to those with
graduate degrees.”93 The require-
ment of simplification alone
hardly inspires confidence in the
system, let alone in the capability of the judges.
This article is not in a position to evaluate the case studies
set forth in the New York Times series. Nor does this article
purport to determine whether the New York Times overempha-
sized the abuses in the system (for journalistic effect or other-
wise) as compared to its successes (if any); used a proper or
improper sampling of cases (e.g., unduly considered new or
old cases or overlooked certain cases); or, in general, used
proper methodology in reaching its conclusions about the
Town and Village Courts.94 Nor may it compete with those
who actually visited the Town and Village Courts, including
undoubtedly some courts in poor areas with insufficient (or
any) lawyers or resources and some in prosperous areas; taken
testimony on the courts as is being done by the Special
Commission on the Future of the New York State Courts; or
undertaken any independent empirical research on how well
any of the Town and Village Courts are working, let alone
whether any are functioning well. Furthermore, it recognizes
that studies are ongoing, and some final reports are yet to be
written.
But even if the New York Times series is not conclusive evi-
dence, many concur that these courts require serious inquiry
[T]he evidence is
growing and 
perhaps
irrefutable that
the non-attorney
judges lack the
knowledge to
do their jobs.
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95. William Glaberson, State’s Justice Courts to Face Scrutiny by
Assembly Panel, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2006; Glaberson, Oversight,
supra note 70, at B-2. 
96. For administrative action being taken with respect to the Town
and Village Courts, see Town and Village Report, supra note 74.
The Town and Village Report was in progress before the New York
Times series was published. See also Press Release, New York State
Unified Court System, First Steps in Action Plan to Improve Quality
of Local Justice Courts, New Appointments and Administrative
Changes Implemented to Enhance Justice Delivery in New York’s
Town and Village Courts (Jan. 16, 2007), http://www.courts.state.
ny.us/press/pr2007_4.shtml; William Glaberson, Big Plan for
Small Courts: Seeking Money to Fix Them, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30,
2007. See also Joel Stashenko, Panel Begins Review of State’s Town
and Village Courts, N.Y.L.J., June 14, 2007 (hereinafter, Stashenko,
Panel Begins Review) (describing the first of a schedule of hearings
held by the Special Commission on the Future of the New York
State Courts; among other testimony, a town justice described
non-lawyer judge’s deficient knowledge of the law and recom-
mended establishing a district court system, which would be
staffed by attorneys only to replace the current system).
97. William Glaberson, Justice Courts in Small Towns to be Upgraded,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2006. 
98. John Caher, Debate on Town Judges Questions Need for Degree, N.Y.
L.J., Jan. 30, 2007 (hereinafter, Caher, Debate).
99. William Glaberson, Assembly Hearing Looks at Reform of New
York’s Town Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2006, at B-4 (hereinafter,
Glaberson, Assembly Hearing).
100. See Stashenko, Panel Begins Review, supra note 96 (describing
the first of a schedule of hearings before the New York Special
Commission on the Future of the New York State Courts). The
website for the Special Commission is http://www.nycourt
reform.org/. The transcript of the hearing held by the Special
Commission on June 13, 2007 is available at http://www.
nycourtreform.org/AlbanyHearingTranscript61307.pdf.
101. William Glaberson, Assembly Hearing, supra note 99. 
102. Town and Village Report, supra note 74, at 43. See also Caher,
Debate, supra note 98, reporting a similar statement by New
York State’s then chief administrative judge “that the vast major-
ity of non-lawyer justices serve ably and responsibly.” One
might wonder whether such a finding might logically justify a
reduction in the education or experience requirements for other
judgeships, at least in courts of limited jurisdiction, since non-
lawyers are evidently doing so well. No one would seriously
suggest such a reduction, however.
Other unsubstantiated contentions in support of non-
lawyer judges include the one made by the chair of a New York
State Senate committee opposing a requirement of law degrees
for the town and village justices, stating: “A lot of towns and vil-
lages think their justices are doing a fine job not being attor-
neys, and I agree….” William Glaberson, “Deeply Concerned,”
Special Panel Will Extend Study to Small-Town Courts, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 24, 2007, at B1, B5. To begin with, no empirical evidence
was presented to back up the assertion of what the towns and
villages think, and no basis was provided for the senator’s state-
ment of agreement with their alleged thinking. One would sus-
pect that a poll of the victims of Town and Village Court injus-
tice would yield a different view, however. In contrast to the sen-
ator’s statements, the chair of a New York State Assembly com-
mittee concluded after legislative hearings that justices should
be required to have law degrees, although she acknowledged the
existence of political opposition to such a requirement. Id.
and reform, if reform is even
possible. It is no coinci-
dence that private court
reform task forces are exam-
ining the problem and filing
reports; and it is not for
nothing that New York has
already instituted adminis-
trative reforms (their suffi-
ciency aside) and is holding
ongoing legislative and com-
mission-sponsored hearings, as discussed in the next section.
Finally, the concept of a non-attorney judge seems as self-
contradictory today as the concept of a doctor without a
medical degree.
C. The Government Response to Town and Village
Courts 
Since the New York Times series, the courts have been sub-
ject to legislative95 and administrative96 scrutiny. The New York
State Office of Court Administration, whose concern over the
Town and Village Courts antedated the New York Times series,
announced limited “plans to increase training for the justices,
to improve their supervision and to better monitor whether
they are protecting basic legal principles like the constitutional
right to a lawyer. . . . . The courts . . . are also to be required for
the first time to keep a word-for-word record of their proceed-
ings, like other courts in the state.”97 The “non-lawyer basic
training program” would increase “from one week to seven.”98
Hearings were scheduled before both houses of the New
York State Legislature, with the first hearing held in December
2006. The first hearing exposed additional problems as a New
York State District Attorney testified to “‘jaw–dropping
moments’ of judicial incompetence. . . that cases simply van-
ished in the local courts for lack of attention, that some jus-
tices did not know how to conduct trials, and that some even
committed crimes or violated ethical rules.”99 Other hearings
are being held on the courts before the Special Commission on
the Future of the New York State Courts, with testimony
including, among other things, the need and feasibility of
attorneys serving as judges in these courts.100
Even after the recent scrutiny, some reportedly have mini-
mized the severity of the problem of using non-lawyer judges.
Whether such sentiments will survive the current inquiries is
unclear. Moreover, such reports do not address the question of
whether such persons would voluntarily subject themselves to
the Town and Village Courts, if they had a choice, or personally
had a good experience there. For example, the president of an
interested trade group for the Town and Village Court judges
downplayed the significance of their lack of education. He tes-
tified at a hearing that judges who “are not lawyers ‘know a lot
of things lawyers don’t know,’ including ‘two subjects relevant
to small-town court cases,’ namely, ‘Trucks and game laws.’” 101
Despite recommending reforms, even the Town and Village
Report on these courts likewise states that “most non-attorney
justices perform their judicial roles admirably and well.” 102
[T]he concept of a
non-attorney judge
seems as self-
contradictory today
as the concept of a
doctor without a
medical degree.
94 Court Review  
making a point about the Town and Village Courts rather than
proposing a solution by eliminating judicial immunity for any-
one. Indeed, in the earlier part of her presentation, she sup-
ported judicial immunity as a general proposition, noting that
“it’s not entirely clear what judicial independence means. To be
sure, there are some things we agree—all of us—that judges
should be free from….[T]hey shouldn’t face personal liability.”
Id. She also supported judicial immunity from suit in Pamela S.
Karlan, Two Concepts of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV.
535, 539-40 (1999) on the grounds that errors may be corrected
on appeal and that “[w]e must allow judges to be free to make
some mistakes in order to avoid chilling the forms of bold action
we really support” (hereinafter Karlan, Two Concepts). 
107. Although the criticism of Town and Village Courts seems to
focus on non-lawyer judges rather than lawyer judges, Professor
Karlan did not suggest in her brief anecdote whether some of
her students were suggesting ending immunity for non-lawyer
judges only or for all Town and Village Court judges.
103. Town and Village Report, supra note 74, at 43. 
104. Town and Village Report, supra note 74, at 41.  The statement in
the text that the education that “law school provides can
empower judges to discern, apply and shape the law” is a rea-
sonable answer to those who might contend that not all attor-
neys (e.g., attorneys who principally handle commercial trans-
actions) have the experience to be judges, only those whose
experience is in the courtroom. Despite differences in experi-
ence among attorneys (including the presence or absence of
courtroom experience), the law-school education is common to
all.  Non-attorney town and village judges by definition do not
have it.
105. Karlan Remarks, supra note 43. Media news stories on the con-
ference are available at Georgetown Law and American Law
Institute, A Conference on the State Judiciary: Conference in the
News, http://www.law.georgetown.edu/judiciary/news.html (last
visited Apr. 2, 2007).
106. Karlan Remarks, supra note 43. Professor Karlan appeared to be
According to the report,
the judges “take very seri-
ously their judicial roles,
and their duties continu-
ally to improve their
knowledge of the law, and
over the years exceptions
to these principles have
been relatively few in num-
ber.”103 The report does
not indicate what percent-
age of non-attorney judges
fall into the category of
performing well and how
many are the exceptions.
In any event, both statements appear to be undocumented and
lack empirical support in the report. 
Furthermore, the Town and Village Report’s complimentary
statements are self-contradictory, as the report itself recognizes
the importance of legal education for judges to enable them to
do their jobs. As the report notes, “there is nearly unanimous
agreement that the unique education that law school provides
can empower judges to discern, apply and shape the law in
ways that non-attorneys can find difficult, if not impossible.”104
D. An Anecdote Regarding Judicial Immunity
The abuses that the New York Times detailed have led some
to question whether such non-lawyer judges even merit the
civil or criminal immunity to which judges are normally enti-
tled. This hypothetical issue was addressed through an anec-
dote related by Stanford Law School Professor Pamela S.
Karlan at the Georgetown Law Center and American Law
Institute program on Fair and Independent Courts: A
Conference on the State of the Judiciary in September 2006.
Professor Karlan noted that the New York Times series “talks
about . . . the truly shocking abuses that occur there [in Town
and Village Courts]. Individuals with ten hours of legal train-
ing and not even a high school diploma, let alone a law
degree, are meting out justice for $900 a year, putting people
in jail, setting bail, denying them protective orders, imposing
staggering fines on them, and announcing they are the law.”105
According to Professor Karlan, this influenced the thinking of
some law students in her class concerning whether the judges
merit judicial immunity:
I [Professor Karlan] was teaching a class on Section
1983 litigation, and I was doing absolute judicial
immunity. And every year … I explain to the students
the appellate process solves a lot of these problems.
Mandamus deals with a lot of these problems.
Threatening judges with financial ruin will obviously
affect their decisions. And most years, I get agreement
from the students immediately. But I didn’t this year,
because of the Glaberson [New York Times] series [on
Town and Village Courts], and students who raised
their hand and described what had happened to them
as undergraduates caught speeding in New York.106
Professor Karlan’s reference to the students who find them-
selves with a speeding charge presumably before non-attorney
judges makes an important point. Where a system of justice
goes awry in a Town and Village Court before a non-attorney
justice, the victim of the injustice may find the failure much
less forgivable than the public at large. Uninvolved parties may
find it easier to defend town and village justices: e.g., by saying
that they are good judges, that remedying the situation would
be too costly, or that attorneys are scarce, thus necessitating
reliance on non-attorney judges. This may not be so easy for
those directly affected by those courts.
The loss of immunity—and thus the threat of financial
ruin—would essentially eliminate the courts.107 It is doubtful
whether anyone would wish to serve as a judge under those
circumstances. However, the question remains whether New
Yorkers may be better off without these courts.
E. The Outlook
To the extent that the courts sometimes fill a need and can-
not be reformed, studies might be conducted to determine
whether the work of these courts could be absorbed by other
existing courts or whether perhaps new courts could be cre-
ated to take over the job of Town and Village Courts. Other
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“[T]he unique 
education that law
school provides can
empower judges to
discern, apply and
shape the law in
ways that non-
attorneys can find
difficult, if not
impossible.”
108. Town and Village Report, supra note 74, at 16. See id. at 12 et
seq. detailing the history of the courts, including proposals to
abolish the courts which have been rejected. The report notes
that “New Yorkers consistently have rejected broad structural
changes to their Justice Courts.” Id. at 14.
109. People v. Charles F., 470 N.Y.S.2d at 346 (Kaye, dissenting).
110. People v. Charles F., 470 N.Y.S.2d at 346 (Kaye, dissenting). See
also Caher, Debate, supra note 98, reporting another argument in
favor of non-attorney judges based upon scarcity of attorneys
(“’We are not all from Appalachia, and we are not all wood-
chucks, but there are areas where there are no attorneys….”’ ).
However, the Rockland County District Attorney responded
that any shortages might be addressed by using attorneys from
surrounding areas as judges. Id.
111. Town and Village Report, supra note 74, at 2.
112. F. Andrew Hanssen, Is There a Politically Optimal Level of Judicial
Independence, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 712, 726 (2004).
113. See Geyh, supra note 8. 
114. Karlan, Two Concepts, supra note 106, at 557. In an update of
Two Concepts, Professor Karlan discussed Alabama Supreme
Court Justice Tom Parker’s statement in an op-ed article in 2006
that states need not follow the United States Supreme Court
decision in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 552 (2005) (executing
defendant who commits otherwise capital crime before the
defendant is 18 years of age violates the Eighth Amendment).
According to Professor Karlan, Justice Parker’s position is that of
claiming “the right to rule independently of existing precedent.”
Karlan, Judicial Independences, supra note 13, 95 GEO. L.J. at
1052. In cases in which controlling precedent is unclear,
Professor Karlan questioned whether “lower court judges
should feel bound to decide the case before them in the way
most likely to be affirmed by the higher court or whether they
are free to push their own views as far as possible, aggressively
distinguishing existing precedents and perhaps even challeng-
ing the higher court to revisit the issue.” Id. at 1053.
areas of inquiry might include whether judges could travel to
the relevant localities served by these courts, litigants could
travel to where other judges are sitting, or litigants and judges
could be linked through telecommunications to handle neces-
sary legal work remotely. Other possible reforms might include
stripping from the courts jurisdiction to hear more serious
cases or providing litigants with the option to have their cases
heard by other courts with attorney judges.
That the courts are reportedly popular with some or that a
remedy is costly need not drive the inquiry.108 Popularity and
cost are dubious concerns where the rights of individuals are
at risk. Even the so-called scarcity of lawyers for these courts
is a questionable consideration, as then New York State Court
of Appeals Judge Judith Kaye noted in a dissent in 1983: “The
argument that it would be difficult throughout the State to find
law-trained persons to serve as Judges cannot preclude what is
constitutionally required.”109 One might similarly question
whether barbers in isolated municipalities should be licensed
to practice dentistry or witch doctors to practice medicine
where true professionals are only available at a distance.
Furthermore, the argument from scarcity of attorneys appears
to be wrong factually in New York. Judge Kaye added that
there are many lawyers in New York State who can handle the
job, citing an earlier case.110
New York should not accept courts which dispense second-
rate (or worse) justice. As the Town and Village Report states:
“Because Justice Courts play such a pivotal role in New York’s
justice system, they must pursue the same, Statewide standard
of justice that New Yorkers expect and deserve in every case
and in every other court.”111 The key question to be answered
then, interim reforms aside, is what will New York (and other
states as well) do about those courts. This remains unresolved
as of the writing of this article.
III. REFLECTIONS ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
The importance of good institutions (independent
judiciaries, for example) to economic growth and
development is widely acknowledged. Nations whose
governments operate under systems of checks and bal-
ances, whose citizens
enjoy civil rights, and
where property rights
are well protected see
both higher levels of
wealth and higher rates
of wealth creation.112
[J]udicial indepen-
dence has two distinct
meanings: First, it refers
to the capacity of a judge to decide cases according to
the facts as she finds them and the law as she conceives
it to be written, without inappropriate external inter-
ference (“decision-making independence”); Second, it
refers to the capacity of the judiciary as a separate and
independent branch of government to resist encroach-
ment from the political branches, and thereby preserve
its institutional integrity (“institutional indepen-
dence”). In both cases, judicial independence is not an
end in itself, but an instrumental value designed to pro-
tect the rule of law.113
The first part of this article covered the Fordham sympo-
sium, which addressed judicial selection reform for state court
judges. The second part considered a particular example of a
judicial system—namely, the Town and Village Courts in New
York State—where judges are neither selected nor trained
properly. The third part will touch on the concept of judicial
independence. It will not attempt to define it any better than
Professor Charles Geyh has in the introduction to this section.
Rather, it will present some of the relevant issues to think
about when using that phrase.
To say that judicial independence is desirable or undesir-
able is to say little unless there is agreement on what judicial
independence means. Fixing its meaning requires attention to
key questions, including independence from what and to do
what. No one wants judges to be free to do whatever they like.
A judge who functions free of the constraints of positive law
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115. See generally Norman L. Greene, Preface, Executioners, Jailers,
Slave-Trappers and the Law: What Role Should Morality Play in
Judging, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 863 (1997) (judges deciding against
conscience); Norman L. Greene, A Perspective on “Nazis in the
Courtroom, Lessons from the Conduct of Lawyers and Judges Under
the Laws of the Third Reich and Vichy, France,” 61 BROOK. L. REV.
1122 (1996); and Norman L. Greene, A Perspective on Temper in
the Court: A Forum on Judicial Civility, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 709
(1996) (judicial intemperance). See also Norman L. Greene,
Introduction, Politicians on Judges: Fair Criticism or Intimidation,
72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 294 (1997) (judicial independence). The
above are published symposia, which the author organized at
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, each of
which is preceded by his preface or introduction.
116. CHARLES GARDINER GEYH, WHEN COURTS AND CONGRESS COLLIDE
(2006), at 279-80. Indeed, since New York’s non-attorney jus-
tices lack any such training, this observation militates in favor
of less rather than more independence for such judges.
117. Karlan, Two Concepts, supra note 106, at 548 (“Precedent takes
some potential outcomes completely off the table. When the law
is clear, parties may not even litigate…”). See also id. at 544
(“When it comes to statutory cases, our general answer is that
we want very little, if any, independence. Assuming that a
statute is constitutional, the job of the courts is to vindicate the
statutory scheme created by the legislature.”).
118. GEYH, supra note 116, at 261 (citing to former Second Circuit
Court of Appeals Judge Jerome Frank).
119. GEYH, supra note 116, at 262.
120. Karlan Remarks, supra note 43. As previously noted, Pamela
Karlan has written extensively on judicial independence.
Karlan, Two Concepts, supra note 106, and Karlan, Judicial
Independences, supra note 14. Among other things, Two Concepts
notes that “judicial independence has both negative and positive
aspects. Judges must be both free from certain kinds of pressures
or influences and free to envision and realize certain goals.”).
Karlan, Two Concepts, supra note 106, at 536.  (emphasis in orig-
inal). 
121. Testimony of Justice Stephen Breyer, Before the House
Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Courts, the
Internet and Intellectual Property, Oversight Hearing on  Judicial
Compensation and Judicial Independence, Apr. 19, 2007, at 8
http://www.uscourts.gov/testimony/JusticeBreyerPay041907.pdf
(“I heard the judges [in a newly independent Russia] talking
about something called ‘telephone justice.’ That, they said,
occurred when the party boss would call to tell the judge how
to decide a particular case. Why did we do it, they asked each
other…. Because we needed the apartment for our families, the
education for our children, the economic necessities that the
Communist Party controlled.”).
122. Norman L. Greene, Introduction, Politicians on Judges: Fair
Criticism or Intimidation, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 294, 294-5 (1997).
“in pursuit of his personal
vision of justice” reflects
“judicial independence run
wild.”114 There are systemic
constraints to deter such
conduct, including codes of
judicial conduct (requiring
patience, temperance, cour-
tesy, competence, and fair-
ness)115 and precedent.
Judges may also be inclined
through their long pre-judi-
cial experience and training
to follow the law rather than their personal preferences and
biases. 116
In many cases, statutory or common law requires a partic-
ular result,117 and there is little question what a judge should
do. But some commentators have questioned what acting
“according to law” in other contexts means, since they doubt
whether there is an immutable source of law, which a good
judge may find and apply.118 Also, critical legal studies pro-
ponents have argued that rather than deciding according to
law, judges make value choices, which are designed to pre-
serve the “political domination of the elites whose values
they share”; and some political scientists have commented on
the importance of a judge’s personal views and attitudes—
rather than the law—in her decision making.119
Judicial independence certainly means that judges are not
coerced to decide cases.120 A good example of coercion is “tele-
phone justice” as described by United States Supreme Court
Justice Stephen Breyer. According to Justice Breyer, this is the
practice that occurred when Soviet party bosses told judges
how to decide cases, and the judges followed orders because
their livelihood was at stake.121 A related fictional account
occurs in the movie Miracle on 34th Street, where a political
boss threatened a judge with the loss of his job if he were to
decide that Kris Kringle is not Santa Claus.122 The fact that we
do not have telephone justice—at least that we know about—
in the United States should not lead to complacency. This is
especially the case since there is a perception that judicial deci-
sions where judges are elected may be affected by a desire not
to alienate campaign contributors or voters. Thus, judicial
independence is a condition free from license and coercion in
decision making, but beyond those borders, there is a fair
ground for discussion. 
In attempting to illustrate judicial independence, commen-
tators sometimes resort to historical accounts of cases in which
judges acted “independently” to apply the law. For example,
contrasted with the Soviet judges (who were not independent)
are the “hero judges.” These are the judges who have stood up
to the popular will to make decisions with which many dis-
agreed, although the law required the decisions. Judges who
make such decisions, according to Chief Justice John G.
Roberts, Jr. (quoting President Reagan), are patriotic, since it is
the job of a judge to do the unpopular thing if necessary to
enforce the rule of law: 
At a reception for judges in the White House,
President Reagan said that the judiciary’s . . .  “commit-
ment to the preservation of our rights often requires the
lonely courage of a patriot.” Those words have stuck
with me since I heard them. And to the extent that
attacks on judicial independence emanate from conser-
vative quarters, I would commend to those quarters
those words from the leading conservative voice of our
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time, “the lonely courage of a patriot.” President Reagan
recognized that it was the job of judges to make unpop-
ular decisions; unpopular with the populace at large,
unpopular with particular social or professional elites.
But he also recognized that the courage required of them
was the courage of a patriot because in making those
unpopular decisions, they were fulfilling the framers’
vision of a society governed by the rule of law.123
President Reagan’s phrase (as quoted by Chief Justice
Roberts) “lonely courage of a patriot” to describe the hero
judge recalls the “courageous federal judges” who struck down
segregation in the face of community opposition in enforcing
Brown v. Board of Education124 in the South.125 It is commonly
accepted that at times, a judge is called upon to identify and
strike down unjust laws or to uphold laws that would elimi-
nate injustice, however unpopular the decision may be. “The
strong claim in favor of judicial independence rests on the case
in which there is a clear legal rule, but either the rule or one of
the litigants is unpopular.”126 Of course, the use of the phrase
“at times” leaves open certain questions, such as the following:
at what times, which laws are unjust, why is the judge’s deci-
sion unpopular, and is there is any legitimate basis for the
unpopularity. 
The image of the lonely courage of a patriot works only
sometimes, depending on what the patriot-judge does or who
the parties are. If a decision is unpopular with a reviled group,
such as segregationists wishing to enforce Jim Crow laws, the
situation is clear. But suppose the decision is unpopular with
parents who support a child protective law stricken down by a
court: are we so sure that the judge is acting patriotically or
even admirably?127 What about an unpopular decision that
creates an injustice in a partic-
ular case, such as by adhering
to a time limit that prevents
submission of powerful proof
of innocence in a criminal
prosecution?
Indeed, the repeated use of
Southern federal judges as
examples of judicial courage
128 suggests either the bril-
liance of the example or the
paucity of situations in which
a consensus on injustice is reached. Alternatively, it may be the
prudent course to reach back to safe historical examples.
However, beyond such examples, there is still controversy over
which laws are unjust, and unpopular decisions may be legiti-
mately unpopular. For example, today some may agree that
harsh criminal laws (including the death penalty) are unjust;
some may not. 129 Others may agree that laws facilitating abor-
tion (or particular types of abortion) are unjust, some may
not.130 Of course, a consensus could probably be reached over
a ruling which has the effect of freeing (or not freeing) an inno-
cent person.
Some have suggested that greater independence might be
achieved were judges to view themselves as one-term judges
without a possibility of being reselected.131 As one judge noted
in a private conversation with me, he was unconcerned with
the political consequences of his actions since “I did some-
thing else before becoming a judge, and if necessary, I can do
something else afterwards.” Therefore, he implied, he would
likely make his decisions without regard to public outcry if he
thought that the decisions were called for by the law and the
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124. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
125. Karlan, Two Concepts, supra note 106, at 558. According to
Professor Karlan, the judges who enforced Brown did follow
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that the judges who enforced the Fugitive Slave Acts or who
presided over the legal apparatus of the Third Reich made pacts
with the devil. But what about the judges who refused to enforce
child labor laws because they thought them dangerous intrusions
on that most fundamental human liberty, freedom of contract?”)
Decisions that are unpopular may also be so because they are
poorly written decisions, not because the judge is a hero. 
128. Karlan, Two Concepts, supra note 106, at 558 (“Our current
image takes as the exemplars of judicial independence the
Supreme Court of Brown v. Board of Education and the coura-
geous federal judges who enforced it in the South.”).
129. Robert F. Worth, Appeals Court Upholds Federal Law on
Executions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2002 (story reports that Second
Circuit reversed ruling finding federal death-penalty law uncon-
stitutional).
130. For discussions of unjust laws, see generally the following sym-
posia preceded by my introductory articles, Norman L. Greene,
Preface, Executioners, Jailers, Slave-Trappers and the Law: What
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facts. Establishing one-term judges, however, has drawbacks.
This may dissuade persons from choosing to interrupt their
practices to become judges and deprive the public of an advan-
tage in having experienced judges.
Furthermore, “the success of our judicial system should not
be made to depend on all judges being heroes,” although
“[h]eroic judges can and have made impartial rulings in the
teeth of public clamor.”132 Even if some judges can withstand
the clamor, others cannot. They still require some tools to
address the situation, including recusal to “disqualify them-
selves in cases in which they cannot be fair and impartial due
to political pressures”133 or resignation. Indeed, a federal circuit
court judge voluntarily resigned when he recognized that poli-
tics might be impinging on his decision making.134 But despite
the availability of these courses of action, there is no assurance
that a judge will adopt this approach, rather than silently yield
to the voice of the crowd. Indeed, if the judge has given in to
the pressure, it may be difficult to determine whether the judge
did so out of coercion or out of disagreement or agreement with
the prevailing law.
IV. CONCLUSION
It matters how appointive systems are designed, and consid-
ering how best to do this was one of the objects of the Fordham
symposium. Whether a state seeks to improve its existing
appointive system or change its system from elections to
appointments, a state will find the Fordham symposium an
important resource on a previously understudied topic. 
Related to the appointment of judges is the question of who
should be allowed to be a judge.  The troubling conduct
reported of judges in New York’s Town and Village Courts,
which are heavily populated by non-lawyer judges as are simi-
lar courts in other states, raises the issue of the failure of judi-
cial selection in its most basic aspects: namely, selecting judges
for courts who are not qualified by way of legal training and
experience. By permitting non-lawyer judges to function in
these courts, New York gives the appearance (if not the fact) of
endangering the rights of at least some of its citizens.  It is dif-
ficult to understand why retaining a system of non-lawyer
judges is a reasonable response to the needs of New Yorkers
and citizens of other states who have the same type of court or
whether better approaches may be designed. 
Finally, there is the related issue of judicial independence.
This is not an area dominated by absolutes.  Indeed, if asked
whether our judiciary should act independently, the most can-
did answer may have to be that it depends on the circum-
stances. This article considers some of the circumstances on
which the answer must rest. 
It is critical for our judges to be well-qualified and neutral.
We therefore need to ensure that the best candidates for the
judiciary are selected, retained, and allowed to make the impor-
tant decisions asked of the courts.   This article addresses some
of the considerations required to assist us to reach these goals.
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